University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1961

Administrative Law Making through Adjudication:
The National Labor Relations Board
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Administrative Law Making through Adjudication: The National Labor Relations Board" (1961).
Minnesota Law Review. 2771.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2771

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

609

Administrative Law Making Through
Adjudication:
The National Labor Relations Board
In the performance of its primary function of administrative adjudication, the National Labor Relations Board
has frequently announced decisional rules which it applies with varying degrees of prospective force. Tie author of this Note analyzes this administrative law making
through adjudication, examining the source and extent of
the Board's power and the extent to which that power is
held in check by judicial review. Seeking some explanation of the limits which the courts have placed upon
Board law making through adjudication, it is concluded
that there is need for a more specific exposition of the
bases upon which the courts will interfere with the application of Board-developed rules. However, the author
further concludes that only a system which retains the
basic flexibility of the present system can adequately resolve the conflict between the need for Board rule making as a guide to administrative policy and the need to
provide a judicial check upon arbitrary application of
rules by expert bodies.
INTRODUCTION
The progress of the last century has not only increased the need
for government regulation but has made both the enactment and
enforcement of regulatory legislation exceedingly complex. In creating administrative agencies to carry into effect the policies of a
statute, Congress typically has delegated power in a manner that
has required the specialized body to exercise considerable discretion in putting its experience to use. It is obvious that any attempt by Congress to delve into all the intricacies of transportation rates, broadcasting licenses and labor-management relations
would be futile; it would impede the legislative process and defeat the effective administration of regulatory statutes governing
complex industrial and economic problems. On the other hand,
no one would contend that unchecked power should be vested in
the agencies. In striking the proper balance, Congress has been
compelled to use rather broad language in many creating statutes
leaving details to the administrator.
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The notion that Congress may not delegate legislative power
has practically become an anachronism in legal thinking.' Nevertheless, the courts, apparently undesirous of giving congressional
delegations carte blanche have occasionally required that Congress
state an "intelligible principle ' 2 or primary standard3 by which
the administrative body must abide. However, the "standards"
which have been established by Congress in an effort to conform
to the judicial requirement have consisted of such vague and general terminology that they have added little if anything to the administrator's understanding of legislative intent.4 Thus, if a statute
is of a prohibitory nature and proscribes activity which is "unreasonable," there arises the question of the extent to which an administrative agency should supplement the broad congressional
standard by establishing a standard of its own that defines the
types of activity which may be termed "unreasonable." A further
question is how may such standards be developed most effectively? Should they be established through administrative adjudication?
Should adjudication result in the development of per se rules under which certain fact situations are regarded as sufficient to establish illegality, foreclosing any obligation to inquire into accompanying circumstances? Or is the decision of each case at the administrative level to turn upon its particular facts?
Due to its great similarity to a court, a substantial part of the
expressions of policy and substantive rules of the National Labor
Relations Board emerge from its decisions in particular cases. In
1. This notion was predicated on the constitutional provision that "All
legislative Power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States ...... U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. In United States v.
& Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932), the Supreme
equivocally that the legislative power of Congress cannot
Professor Jaffe has stated what seems to be the proper
gressional delegation:

Shreveport Grain
Court stated unbe delegated. But
approach to con-

We must not take lightly the objection to indiscriminate and ill-defined delegation. It expresses a fundamental democratic concern. But
neither should we insist that "lawmaking" as such is the exclusive
province of the legislature. The aim of government is to gain acceptance for objectives demonstrated as desirable and to realize them as
fully as possible. We should recognize that legislation and administration are complementary rather than opposed processes; and that dele-

gation is the formal term and method for their interplay. Finally we
should demand no more than that in the total process we achieve government by consent.

Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of
359, 360 (1947).
2. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
3. United States v. Shreveport
(1932).
4. E.g., "public interest," New
States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932); "just

Legislative Power: I, 47 COLUM. L. Rv.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85
York Central Securities Corp. v. United
and reasonable," Tagg Bros. & Moorhead

v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930); "unfair methods of competition,"
Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
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fact, the Board has utilized its power to adjudicate more extensively than most other administrative agencies;' the very nature of
labor-management relations necessarily involves the settlement of
disputes of an adversary character which arise in the course of
collective bargaining. In a number of its decisions the Board has
attempted to establish standards, the violation of which are subse-

quently to be treated as per se violations of the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. It shall be
the purpose of this Note to examine the sources and extent of the
Board's power to formulate decisional rules-in particular those

which declare certain conduct to be unlawful per se. Consideration

then will be given to the manner in which that power is exercised,
whether the establishment of such rules is desirable, and the extent to which the courts will substitute their judgment and provide
the necessary "check" '6 upon the Board's adjudicative law making.
I.

THE NATURE OF NLRB LAW MAKING

One means available to the Board for the formulation of law
and policy is administrative rule making. Section 6 of the National

Labor Relations Act empowers the Board to make rules and regulations to effectuate the policies of the Act.' Although this broad

provision has been interpreted as authorizing the Board to estab5. It has been pointed out that "during its history the Board has decided more cases than the Supreme Court of the United States or any
other judicial tribunal. It has more litigation before the courts than any
other independent agency or executive department of the Government.'
Jenkins, What is the National Labor Relations Board?, 12 U. FLA. L. REV.
354,363 (1959).
6. The "principle of check" is discussed in 4 DAvis § 28.21, at 113
where the author says: "A check upon administrative authority is desirable for the same reasons that an appellate court's check upon a trial court
is desirable."
7. The rule making function of the administrative agency has been regarded as its legislative power. See 1 VON BAuR, FEDERAL ADmrNJSTRATiVE LAW § 8 (1942) and Note, Stare Decisis in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, 35 GEo. L.J 69, 72 (1946). The United States Supreme Court has
drawn the distinction between adjudication and legislation as follows:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist ....
Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and
changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). Some
doubt has been cast on the validity of this distinction. See note 21 infra.
8. Section 6 provides:
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend,
.and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this subchapter.
49 Stat. 452, as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1958).
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lish only procedural rules,9 the legislative history of the section indicates that it may encompass authority for substantive rule-making.'0 A similar broad grant of power appears in section 7805 of
the Internal Revenue Code, empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title . . .""

This grant of power has been con-

strued as enabling the Treasury to make interpretative rather than
legislative regulations.12 A legislative regulation may be defined
as one promulgated pursuant to a specific or general grant of rulemaking power to an administrative agency.'" If such a regulation
is valid, 4 it will have the force and effect of law, with the result
9.

The National Labor Relations Board's power to "make, amend and
rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this chapter" . . . has been assumed to extend only
to matters of procedure, and the Board does not in fact attempt to
define unfair labor practices by regulation.
U.S. Att'y. Gen. Comm. on Admin. Procedure, Administrative Procedure
in Government Agencies, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 98 n.18
(1941).
10. The Board has itself stated that it could derive power to make substantive rules from § 6 of the Act. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SURVEY AND STUDY
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE IN TIlE
FEDERAL AGENCIES-AGENCY RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE 1812 (Comm.

Print 1957). As is pointed out in Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 730-33
n.20 (1961), the original version of the Taft-Hartley Act, H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), provided that the Board had the authority to
make "such regulations as may be necessary to carry out their respective
functions under this Act." In view of the elimination of the word "rules,"
this version of the section was viewed by a minority of the House Committee on Labor Education as denying power to the Board to make substantive rules. Since the version of § 6 as finally enacted grants authority to make "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this subchapter," see note 8 supra, the inference is
strong, as Professor Peck suggests, that Congress sought to preserve the
Board's substantive rule-making power.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805.
12. See 1 DAVIS § 5.03, at 300.
13. The action of the Federal Communications Commission in American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232 (1936), is a good example of a legislative regulation. In that case the Supreme Court upheld
an order of the Commission prescribing a uniform system of accounts for
telephone companies pursuant to a provision of the Communications Act
of 1934 empowering the Commission to "prescribe the forms of any and
all accounts, records, and memoranda . . . ." 48 Stat. 1078 (1934), 47
U.S.C. § 220(a) (1958). The Court said it was not free "to substitute its
own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the
bounds of their administrative powers." 299 U.S. at 236.
14. Professor Davis has pointed out that the courts, in establishing the
validity of a legislative rule, will determine whether it is within the delegated authority, reasonable, and issued pursuant to proper procedure. 1
DAVIS § 5.05, at 315.
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that courts will refrain from substituting their judgment for that of

the agency." 5
The definition of an interpretative regulation is more difficult.
It has been said that interpretative rules "only interpret the statute
to guide the administrative agency in the performance of its duties until directed otherwise by decision of the courts"16 and that

they "do not receive statutory force and their validity is subject to
challenge in any court proceeding in which their application may
be in question."'17 Thus, although it is generally recognized that

courts are free to substitute judgment as to interpretative rules,18
,uch rules often result in the creation of law and are frequently
accorded great weight in judicial decisions."9
If section 6 were to be viewed as empowering the Board to establish substantive as well as procedural rules, the administrative
rule-making power could be extended to many areas where Board
policy has been developed through case-by-case adjudication. An
outstanding example is the formulation of jurisdictional standards,
which rest in something of a no-man's land between procedural
and substantive law."0 Rule-making, however, is typically designed to have a general effect rather than an application limited to
individual parties.2 1 Thus, for determination of specific controversies, the agency must turn to the function of adjudication.
Th&Board's adjudicative function is derived from section 10(a)
of the National Labor Relations Act, which empowers the
Board to "prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice . . . affecting commerce, ' '2 2 and outlines the procedures
by which the Board may issue an appropriate order based on its
independent opinion. With the passing of time and the accumula-

15. Id. § 5.03, at 299.
16. Comptroller of Treasury v. M. E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234,
107 A.2d 93, 98 (1954).
17. U.S. Att'y. Gen. Comm. on Admin. Procedure, Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies, S. Doe. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 100

(1941).
18. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Supreme

Court, although expressing deference for the rulings of the Wage & Hour
Administrator, said that such rulings were "not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority . . . ...
Id. at 140.
19. See 1 DAvis § 5.05, at 314.
20. See discussion of jurisdictional standards in text accompanying notes
148-52 infra.
21. Rule-making has been described as "the issuance of regulations or
the making of determinations which are addressed to indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons or situations . . . ." Fuchs, Procedure In
Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. Rtv. 259, 265 (1938). However,
Professor Davis has pointed out that the generalization thus made may be
too broad in view of the fact that rules may be designed to affect individuals while adjudication may involve thousands of unnamed parties. 1 DAvis § 5.01, at 287.
22. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
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tion of cases, certain categories of decisions on similar facts inevitably fall into a pattern which constitutes the basis for administrative
law and policy formulation. And these rules are formulated with
varying degrees of inflexibility. The same process takes place in the
courts, which in the course of decision, formulate rules of law for
future application.2 3 Indeed it is on this foundation of the constant
reapplication of precedent and judge-made law that the common
law is built.2"
The Board, because it states its position in a decision, is adjudicating in the sense of making an administrative order directed
at the employer charged with violation. But often the practical effect is the establishment of a rule." To illustrate: An employer
is charged with violation of the rights guaranteed to employees by
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act2" as a result of interrogating them as to their union affiliations or sentiments. The
Board decides against the employer stating, for example, "all interrogation by an employer of employees as to union affiliation is
unlawful per se."
The most accurate and descriptive term for this fusion of adjudication and formulation of rules of law in the course of decision
is administrative law-making through adjudication. This may seem
to be nothing more than the attachment of a label; but it serves to
make it clear that neither the procedure by which the Board sets
standards in its decisions, nor the power by which it proceeds, are
directly derived from its statutory rule-making function. It is adjudication from which rules of general application emerge.
It may be argued that while the Board can apply its expertise
in understanding and dealing with individual fact situations, it may
have neither the power nor the qualifications to establish in the
23. For a discussion of the law-making function of the courts and its
relation to the separation of powers doctrine, see Parker, The Historic
Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy,

12

RUTGERS L. REV. 449, 473 (1958).
24. A discussion of the development of the common law in the courts
is beyond the scope of this Note. For the most recent work on this subject, see LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
25. The Administrative Procedure Act § 2(c), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5
U.S.C. § 1001 (1958) defines "rule" as "the whole or any part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to

implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy .

. . ."

With reference to

this definition it has been said that "an order requiring specified affirmative action in the future, such as an order of the NLRB requiring the employer to reinstate employees with back pay, fits perfectly the Act's definition of 'rule.'" 1 DAvis § 5.02, at 295. In an article on the question of Board
law-making through adjudication, the apt statement was made that "particular cases are used merely as vehicles for the statement of new general
rules which are to govern future cases. Adjudication is used as a clumsy
substitute for rule-making." Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the
NLRB, 6 SYRAcUSE L. REV. 93, 106 (1954).
26. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
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course of adjudication an express rule of law designed to operate
prospectively. 27 Because of alleged excesses of administrative zeal,
bias and political pressure, 28 the application of agency-formulated
criteria may often prove arbitrary; an agency may follow precedent
to the extent of disregarding factors in specific cases which would
make previously established rules or policy inapplicable. The extent to which administrative determinations are subjected to judicial scrutiny upon review is significant as a means of providing
redress against agency abuses of discretion. Consequently, the following sections will deal with the manner and specific instances in
which the Board's decisional rules are established, the extent to
which Board determinations rest on precedent evolved through stare
decisis and the scope and nature of judicial review of administrative law-making through adjudication. -9
1-. EXAMPLES OF NLRB FORMULATION OF
DECISIONAL RULES
A.

SECONDARY PRESSURES AND THE COMMON SITUs DOCTRINE

It is unlawful for a labor union to exert pressure upon a neutral
employer in order to compel him to cease dealing with a primary
employer involved in a labor dispute, where the object of such
pressure is to exact certain concessions from the primary employer.3" At the same time, the right of employees to exert direct
27. It is to be noted, however, that "the courts often refrain from substituting judgment on . . . questions [of what the law 'should be'] wheth-

er or not they happen to label such questions as questions of fact." 4 DAvis

§ 30.04, at 209 citing NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344
(1953).

28. For an excellent discussion of the possible effect of changes in po-

litical administration upon Board policy see Note, The NLRB under Republican Administration: Recent Trends and their Political Implications,
55 COLUM. L. REv. 852 (1955).
29. In the following discussion no attempt will be made to consider all

labor-management problems which may be relevant to the central theme.
The focus is primarily on cases involving unfair labor practices. The rule
of decision, however, also becomes evident in the area of craft severance,

see Note, NLRB Rules for Determining the Appropriate Bargaining Unit
in Craft and DepartmentalSeverance Cases, 45 MINN. L. REv. 391 (1961),

and attention is directed to the establishment by the Board of contract bar
rules dealing with the time and manner of a union's filing of a represen-

tation petition while there exists a collective bargaining agreement with a
rival union. See Freidin, The Board, The "Bar," and the Bargain, 59 CoLuM.
L. REv. 61 (1959).

30. Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amend-

ed, reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-

(4)

(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage [the employees of

any employer] any individual employed by any person engaged in

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45: 609

economic pressure on the primary employer is to be safeguarded. 3 '
Consequently it is necessary to distinguish between protected primary activity and prohibited "secondary boycotts." 2 The distinction becomes extremely difficult to draw where two employers
are doing business on the same premises and picketing at the
"common situs" influences the neutral employer directly or through
his employees. The language of section 8 (b) (4) (A) does not make
it clear whether Congress intended "a sweeping prohibition against
secondary boycotts."3 3 As a result, a considerable amount of administrative interpretation and rule-making has been necessary in
this area.
One type of "common situs" case arises where the activities of
the primary employer are intermittently conducted at neutral premises. 4 Moore D.

Dock Co." presented such a "roving" or "am-

bulatory" situs problem and gave rise to the establishment by the
Board of definite criteria for the decision of cases of this type.
In that case, the picketing union had attempted to organize the
employees of the primary employer. Having previously established
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in a strike

or a [concerted] refusal in the course of [their] his employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods . . . or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce,
or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-

(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to
join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibitedby subsection 8(e) ...

Labor Management Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29
U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1960).
The bracketed words are those deleted from the Act by the 1959
Landrum-Griffin amendments. The italicized portions of the quoted statute
are those which have been added by the 1959 amendments.
For a consideration of the impact of the 1959 changes on the materials
that follow, see note 52 infra.
3 1. Section 8(b) (4) (A) has been interpreted as evidencing legislative intent "to accommodate the conflicting interests of employees in exerting effective economic pressures on an employer and the interests of neutral
employers in freedom from involvement in disputes not their own." Cushman, Secondary Boycotts and the Taft-Hartley Law, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV.
109. 114 (1954).

32. Congress did not use this term in the Act. This interpretation was
placed on it in Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 346 (The Pure Oil Co.).
84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949).
33. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters, AFL v. NLRB, 357 U.S.
93, 98 (1958).
34. Another type of "common situs" case arises where the employees
of a neutral employer work on the primary employer's premises. In Oil
Workers Int'l Union, Local 346 (The Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315
(1949), the union picketed such primary premises and indicated by signs
that the activity was directed against the primary employer. This was
held lawful primary pressure despite the evident effect on neutral employees.
35. Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).

NOTES
the legality of picketing a primary situs,3" the Board considered
the question of .whether the right to picket would continue when
the situs was moved to the premises of a neutral employer. The
picketing, conducted on neutral premises, was upheld because in
the Board's opinion it was "primary activity" despite the effect it
might have had on the employees of the neutral employer. The
Board concluded that in such a situation, where the only place at
which picketing could be effective was at the secondary employer's premises, the activity would be lawful providing the following
conditions were met:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time
of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close
to the location of the situs; (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the
dispute is with the primary employeras

The corollary to these rules, however, appeared to be that failure to comply with the standards set would result in a finding that
section 8(b) (4) (A) had been violated as a matter of law.39
Subsequently, the Board added another condition to those already established in Moore Dry Dock. Washington Coca Cola
Bottling Works, Inc.4" raised the problem of whether secondary
picketing should be allowed when the primary employer has a
plant in the area which the union can picket. The Board held that
36. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 346 (The Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.LR.B.

315 (1949).

37. The distinction has been pointed out between "organizational" picketing and that conducted by a union which represents the employees of
the primary employer:
This much, at least, can be said for the Ryan case [Ryan Constr.
Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949)1-the picketing union did represent the
employees of the company at which the economic pressure was directed. However, in Moore Drydock Co., the Board eventually extended
the situs doctrine to cases where the picketing union represented none
of the employees of the primary employer, although it was obvious
that there was here no primary strike at all in the ordinary sense of
employees quitting the employ of the primary employer in concert.
Thus the situs doctrine legalized a secondary boycott if the pickets
confined their activities to the premises of the employer whose employees they were attempting to unionize against their will, even
though another employer occupied the same premises and it was his
employees who were induced to strike.
Reilly, A Return to Legislative Intent, 43 GEo. L.J. 372, 384-85 (1955).
38. 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549.
39. The Board said that § 8(b) (4) (A) was "aimed at secondary
boycotts and secondary strike activities," 92 N.L.R.B. at 547, contrasting this
to lawful primary activity. In announcing the four criteria for legality,
the Board said the "picketing of the premises of a secondary employer is
" 92 N.L.R.B. at 549.
primary if it meets the following conditions ....
(Emphasis added.)
40. 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), enforced, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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where such a primary plant was available, picketing at the secondary situs would not be permissible. This was stated in the form
of a rule and although the words per se were not used, if such a
plant had been available, it is not likely that the Board would have
inquired further to find special circumstances legalizing the picketing. It is significant, however, that in approving the Washington
Coca Cola doctrine,"' the court of appeals did not approve the
Board's decision as a standard or rule for future application. Instead the court stated in a very brief opinion that the Board's decision was "based on factual findings which we think were sustained by substantial evidence and so are binding on us." 2
The view that the Board may not apply its rules without considering individual fact situations was again propounded by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. General Drivers, AFL (Otis Massey)." The court reversed the Board's decision that, under the rule of Washington Coca Cola, section 8 (b) (4)
(A) had been violated, pointing out that approval of Board-formulated criteria such as those in Moore Dry Dock had been
based on substantial evidence in the particular case; it gave no judicial support to the Board's standard as such. The court concluded
that such a finding would "elevate the Board-formulated 'criteria'
by judicial fiat to a vantage point from which it could . . . circunvent the statute."44
When the Board applied the Washington Coca Cola rule in
Sales Drivers Union,4 5 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia refused to enforce its order enjoining the picketing, saying in part:
The existence of a common site . . . and of another place which
can be picketed, are factors to be considered in determining whether
or not the section has been violated, but alone are not conclusive. 46
Sales Drivers has been cited for the proposition that while the
courts were willing to accept the factual basis of the Washington
Coca Cola decision as sufficient evidence to support a finding
based on the entire record, they have declined to regard its doctrine as established.17 This view is supported by the court's state41. Local 67, Brewery & Beverage Drivers v. NLRB, 220 F.2d 380
(D.C. Cir. 1955).
42. Id. at 381.
43. 225 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
44. 225 F.2d at 209.
45. Sales Drivers Union (Campbell Coal Co.), 110 N.L.R.B. 2192
(1954), enforcement denied, Sales Drivers Union v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514
(D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956).
46. Sales Drivers Union v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
47. See Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and BoycottsAnother Chapter, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 125, 134 (1959).
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ment in Sales Drivers that "a violation of section 8(b) (4) (A)
is not to be found by a rule of decision based upon findings which
are inadequate to support the conclusion reached." 4 The court
further stated that a rule as rigid as that established in Washington
Coca Cola was not deducible from the language of section 8(b)
(4) (A) and to read it into the statute by implication would unduly limit the right to strike guaranteed by section 11.,
It is doubtful that the words of caution expressed by the court
in Sales Drivers were really necessary, for the Board had already
modified the strict application of the Washington Coca Cola
rule before Sales Drivers was decided. The Board indicated in
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.5" that it would not arbitrarily apply a
standard previously set where particular facts would make such
application unreasonable. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, picketing was
being conducted by the union at two different construction sites.
As to one site the Board found a violation of section 8(b) (4)
(A) because the picketing was not strictly confined to the primary
employer involved in the dispute but was also directed to the employees of neutrals. With respect to the picketing at the other site,
however, the Board refused to find a per se violation merely because one of the primary employer's plants was in the area and
could have been picketed. The Board explained its position by
distinguishing the Washington Coca Cola case as follows:
In our Washington Coca Cola decision, we endeavored to make

clear that the doctrine therein enunciated was being applied with due
regard for the right of the Respondent Union to picket effectively
... .It will be noted that the union in that case picketed the main
plant of Coca Cola . . . from the first day of the strike, and that the

drivers involved entered and left the plant at least four times each
day. Accordingly, it was clear that the application of the Washington
Coca Cola doctrine to the facts in that case would not unduly circun-

In the instant matscribe the union in its right to picket effectively.
5
ter, however, we do not have such assurance. 1

The Board also pointed out that the Washington Coca Cola
rule would not be applied where the premises of the secondary em48. 229 F.2d at 519.
49. 229 F.2d at 517. Section 13 of the National Labor Relations Act

provides:

Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall

be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications
on that right.
49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163
(1958).
50. 110 N.L.R.B. 455 (1954).
51. Id. at 457. (Emphasis added.)
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ployer harbored the
situs of the dispute between the union and the
52
primary employer.
Self-limitation of the type demonstrated by the Board in Pittsburgh Plate Glass indicates that its decisional rules, even its per se
rules, are not inflexible. The judicial approach to the problem
adopted by the court of appeals in Sales Drivers indicates that the
primary concern of the courts is whether the evidence found by
the Board is sufficient to sustain its conclusion in a particular
case-the "substantial evidence" test. 3 Apparently, then, the
Board as well as the courts understand that in order to avoid arbitrary results under a rigidly defined rule, each case must be
capable of determination on its particular facts. It is somewhat
less clear whether the courts have fully recognized that development of Board policy into rules by means of adjudication provides a desirable means of formulating guides for future conduct.
The court in Sales Drivers, having disapproved of the Board's
failure to base its decision on adequate findings of fact, remanded
the case to the Board. On remand, the Board arrived at the same
decision 4 supported by some additional facts and the court affirmed.55 It may be inferred that the Board appeased the court
by finding additional facts. On the other hand, this result indicates the manner in which judicial review acts as a check on administrative action in that it causes the Board to re-examine its
own findings and base its decision on a firm foundation of evidence.
B. COERCION THROUGH SPEECH

The degree to which an employer may express his views respecting unionism to his employees involves a balancing of the
employer's right of free speech against the rights of employees to
52. Section 8(b) (4) (A), as amended by the 1959 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)
(4) (A) (Supp. 1960), changes some aspects of the prior law in this area.
However, it -has been concluded that neither § 8(b) (4) (A) as it now stands.
nor the proviso in § 8(b) (4) (B) that "nothing contained in this clause shall
be construed to make unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing,"
has any effect on the cases establishing rules for distinguishing primary
from secondary activity, e.g., Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92

N.L.R.B. 547 (1950); Brewery Drivers, AFL (Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.), 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
110 N.L.R.B. 455 (1954). See Farmer, The Status and Application of the
Secondary-Boycott and Hot-Cargo Provisions, 48 GEO. L.J. 327 (1960).
53. See discussion of the substantial evidence test as applied to Board
decisions in note 167 infra.
54. Sales Drivers Union (Campbell Coal Co.), 116 N.L.R.B. 1020
(1956).
55. Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958).
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be free tom coercion in the exercise
of their rights of self-organization and collective bargaining.5 5 The time at which an employer's speech can most effectively influence employees is when
made directly preceding a representation election.' The Act, however, provides no specific limitations upon the time which an employer may choose to speak to his employees; no unfair labor
.practice will be found unless the expressions of the employer contain some "threat of reprisal or promise of benefit.""5
The Board pronounced its broadest rule in this area in Bonwit
Teller, Inc.,5 9 where it held that a speech on company time and
premises on the eve of a Board representation, election, was an unfair labor practice unless the union was permitted to make a rebuttal speech under.identical conditions. The Board continued to
apply and elaborate upon this rule until recognition of the rule's
undue rigidity caused a ,hange of policy. In Livingston Shirt
Corp.6 the Board determined that the Act specifically prohibited
56. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act provides:
F-_,ployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). This section is
to be considered in conjunction with § 8(a) (1) which makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 49 Stat. 452
(1935), as amended,29 U.S.C.§ 158(a)(1) (1958).
57. Representation elections are held pursuant to § 9(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)
(1958), which provides:
(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor
organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number
of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and
that their employer declines to recognize their representative . . ., or
(ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified . . . is no longer a representative . . .
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause
to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing . . . . If the Board
finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof . . . . (Emphasis added.)
58. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958).
59. 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951), affd, Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197
F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
60. Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 405 (1953). For instances
where the Board applied the Bonwit Teller doctrine prior to 1953, see
Higgins, Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 829, 101 N.L.R.B. 911 (1952); Onondaga Pottery Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1952); National Screw & Mfg. Co. of Calif.,
101 N.L.R.B. 1360 (1952); Biltmore Manufacturing Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 905
(1951).
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it from finding that an uncoercive speech, whenever delivered by
the employer, constitutes an unfair labor practice. The Board asserted that an employer could not be held to have violated the Act
on the sole ground that the employees had been refused an equal
opportunity to reply.
Peerless Plywood Co., 1 decided on the same day as Livingston
Shirt, did not involve an unfair labor practice charge but rather
the setting aside of a representation election. In that case, the
Board laid down the rule that such election would be set aside if a
representative of either the employer or the union made a speech
to the employees within twenty-four hours prior to the election.
The rule-making character of this decision was clearly indicated
by the Board's statement that it was establishing "an election rule
which will be applied in all election cases . . . . Violation of the
rule will cause the election to be set aside whenever valid objections are filed." 2 This rule was cited with approval in NLRB v.
Shirlington Supermarket,6 3 where the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated that whether a representation election has
been conducted under conditions compatible with the exercise of a
free choice by the employees "is a matter which Congress has
committed to the discretion of the Board."64
A related area is that of employer interrogation of employees
as to union membership, a practice which the Board consistently
held to be unlawful per se prior to 1954.5 In that year, as a result of judicial disapproval of this broad condemnation, ' the
Board reversed its established doctrine. It held in Blue Flash Express, Inc.,67 that the proper test was whether "under all the circumstances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act.""'
The Blue Flash opinion sheds considerable light on the Board's
view respecting the effect of a per se standard. The majority
pointed out that a finding that all interrogation is unlawful per se
61.
62.
63.
64.

Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
Id. at 429.
224 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1955).
Id. at 651.

65. E.g., Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
66. E.g., NLRB v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 209 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.
1954); Wayside Press, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1953); NLRB
v. England Bros., Inc., 201 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Arthur
Winer, Inc., 194 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 192 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Tennessee Coach Co., 191
F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1951); Sax v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1948):
Jacksonville Paper Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1943).
67. 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
68. Id. at 593.
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would mean that a casual, friendly, isolated instance of interrogation
by a minor supervisor would subject the employer to a finding that he

had committed an unfair labor practice ....
ITihe Board is required to determine the significance of particular acts of interrogation in the light of the entire record in the case . . .69

The Board's positions in Blue Flash and in Livingston Shirt are
indicative of its willingness to engage in self-limitation when its
experience demonstrates that a rigid rule would work hardship on
either unions or management. There is also a clear demonstration
in Blue Flash of deference to judicial opinion shown by the ma-

jority's statement that the dissenting Board members "appear to
overlook cases . . . in which the courts of at least six circuits
have explicitly or by necessary implication condemned the rationale of [the per se cases]." 70
If this regard for court decisions and declination to act arbitrarily prevailed in the Board's handling of all labor problems, it
would be possible to view the establishment of a per se rule as the
result of considered administrative and judicial judgment. However, a consideration of other Board determinations may prove
such a generalization inaccurate.
C. UNION SEcuRrrY-HIRING HALLS

According to sections 8(a)(1), (3) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, it
is unlawful for an employer to require membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, or for a union to cause
an employer to discriminate in hiring on the basis of union membership.7 1 In view of these provisions, a major problem is presented by the making of "hiring-hall agreements" under which the
union operates as an employment agency from which the employer is to take all replacements unless he can give the union a
valid reason for rejection.
Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors'
and subsequent decisions are particularly interesting from the

standpoint of the Board's development of per se rules respecting
certain hiring hall arrangements and the treatment which the
courts have accorded the Board's applications of those rules.
In 1951 the Board had held that an agreement that hiring be
done only through a particular union's offices did not violate the
69. Id. at 595.
70. Id. at 593.
71. National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), as amended,

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), 158(b)(2) (1958).
72. 119 N.LR.B. 883 (1958), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Mountain
Pacific Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 270 F.2d 425

(9th Cir. 1959).
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Act absent evidence that the union unlawfully discriminated in
supplying the company with personnel.7 3 Then, in Mountain Pacific the Board held that because an exclusive union hiring hall
agreement "encourages union membership" regardless of the manner in which it is enforced, such an agreement was per se discriminatory within the meaning of section 8(a)(3) in the absence of provisions also requiring: (1) that selection of applicants be on a nondiscriminatory basis, and not affected in any
way by union membership; (2) that the employer retains the
right to reject any applicant referred by the union; and (3) that
the parties to the agreement post notices advising applicants for
employment of the manner in which the hiring hall will select replacements. 4 The impact of this per se rule may be discerned
from the Board's language:
We hold the hiring hall provisions of this contract to be unlawful.
For purposes of our decision, therefore, it is unnecessary to determine

whether there is sufficient evidence apart from the contract to support
the allegation of discriminatory practices in hiring.7 5

In effect, the Board did not find a violation because of any particular discriminatory practice or because of the provisions of the
hiring hall contract. Rather it based the decision on its evaluation of the discriminatory effects inherent in the operation of hiring halls and on the fact that the contract did not include the antidiscrimination provisions enunciated by it for the first time in this
case and applied retroactively. The establishment of such per se
rules raises the question of whether the Board is effectuating the
policies of the section of the act directed against discriminatory
practices when it establishes a rule making hiring hall contracts
unlawful regardless of the existence of discrimination.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seems to have answered this question in the negative in its opinion denying enforcement of the Board's order." The court pointed out that a
hiring hall is generally legal; and while a contract containing discriminatory provisions is illegal per se, the court held that one
which is not discriminatory on its face cannot be declared unlawful merely because of the absence of the suggested clauses and
without any findings of discrimination. Unfortunately, however,
the opinion is rather unclear as to the court's exact position.
The court said:
As we understand the Board, the contract would be legal if it contain73. Hunkin-Conkey Const. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 433 (1951).
74. 119 N.L.R.B. at 897.
75. Id. at 894.
76. NLRB v. Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
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ed the required provisions, although it might be found as a fact that
there was encouragement of union membership by such a combination through illegal discrimination. W

And further:
The Board held that, as a matter of law, a labor contract containing
provisions permitting the maintenance of a hiring hall which omitted
certain prohibitory stipulations was per se invalid and contrary to
law.78

Because the court felt that this rule of per se illegality was too

"extreme" to be maintained,7 9 the case was remanded to the
Board for further findings. However, in the same opinion, the
court also said:
It must be remarked that the Board had . . . [previously] held a pro-

vision permitting a Union to settle seniority was legal, but reversed
its position as a matter of law, and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit therefore required its order to operate prospectively
only. But here the Board does not intimate that the hiring hall is per
se illegal80

Does this mean that the court would have approved a rule of
per se illegality if it had been given only prospective force even
though it remanded the case because the rule was too extreme?
Further language of the court indicates that it may have intended to assert a third position-approval of the rule if used by the
Board merely to create a presumption of discrimination:
The Board is qualified by its specialized knowledge and experience in

the field, to say that it will give peculiar weight to certain evidence.
The common law courts have built up such rules and enforce them.
There seems to be no valid reason why an administrative body cannot

progress from precedent to precedent. . . . [S]uch a rule of evidence
should operate prospectively . . . . [Tihis Court sees no reason why

the doctrine once announced could not be applied in future cases.81

This case typifies the uncertainty that often exists as to the scope
of judicial review of administrative decisions in which rules are established. Was the court demanding further evidence to support
the Board's order? Did the court disapprove of the rule as such or
was it only seeking to avoid retroactive application of the rule?
Despite several recent decisions in the courts of appeals and a
very recent decision by the United States Supreme Court,'m no
77. Id. at 431. (Emphasis added.)
78. Id. at 432.

79. Ibid.
80. Id. at 429. (Emphasis added.)

81. Id. at 432.

82. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
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adequate criteria have yet been developed defining the proper
scope of administrative adjudications or the extent of administrative discretion in adjudicative rule-making.
In Local 176, United Bhd. of Carpenters,3 the Board found
that the union maintained an oral agreement with the company requiring job clearance from the union as a prerequisite to employment, and that this practice constituted a per se violation of the
Act for the reasons set forth in Mountain Pacific. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, 4 but denied that the
Board in Mountain Pacific had held that union hiring halls are
presumptively operated in a discriminatory manner. The court
explained that the basis for the Board's Mountain Pacific decision
was that a job applicant would believe that the hall was so operated and this belief would induce him to join the union unless a
notice to the effect that there would be no discrimination was
posted at the hiring hall. The first circuit's opinion does not allow the conclusion that the Board can dispose of the hiring hall
through the application of a rule of per se illegality. The court
said that there was "ample evidence warranting the Board's finding . . . that all employees would have to obtain job clearance
from the union,"85 thereby at least implying that absent such specific factual evidence, a violation could not be found.
It seems clear that the Board in Mountain Pacific held that a
hiring hall agreement which failed to meet the prescribed standards was unlawful per se, a holding which was undoubtedly based
upon its expert understanding of the coercive effect that the hiring
hall system has upon an applicant for employment who fears that
his livelihood may depend upon membership in the union. Certainly the Board's opinion in Mountain Pacific provided sufficient
reason to believe that the hiring hall system may be inherently
coercive." The courts should have considered whether the broad
83. 122 N.L.R.B. 980 (1959).
84. NLRB v. Local 176, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, AFLCIO, 276 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1960).
85. Id. at 586.

86. The Board said:
Here the very grant of work at all depends solely upon union sponsorship, and it is reasonable to infer that the arrangement displays and
enhances the Union's power and control over the employment status.
We believe, however, that the inherent and unlawful encouragement of
union membership that stems from unfettered union control over the
hiring process would be negated, and we would find an agreement to
be nondiscriminatory on its face, only if the agreement explicitly provided that: [listing the three criteria.]
We would draw a . . . line between the type of unfettered arbitrary

hiring hall present here and one including the safeguards set forth
above.
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terms of the statute could effectively prevent discrimination without the implementation of administratively-developed standards.
The courts, viewing the problems of labor and management
from the high plateau of a general overlooking the battlefield, may
lack the experience and information to deal with the intricacies
of a single maneuver, which can best be dealt with by those who
have been intensively engaged in the field. Consideration of the
need to use administrative expertise effectively might have resulted in a more thorough and explicit definition of the scope
of the Board's power to make rules by adjudication. Although
current decisions by the United States Supreme Court and by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit give somewhat greater consideration to the scope of the Board's adjudicatory rule-making
power, it is questionable whether those courts gave sufficient
weight to the need for authoritative rule making founded upon specialized knowledge.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
NLRB v. E. & B. Brewing Co.,17 was handed down a few days
after the First Circuit's Local 176 decision and is interesting in its
treatment of the entire area of Board law-making through adjudication. In this case, the court of appeals denied enforcement of a
Board order' directing reinstatement with back pay of an employee who, according to the Board, had been discriminatorily discharged. The petition against the employer and the union did not
put in issue the legality of the hiring hall agreement; nevertheless,
the Board used the case as a vehicle for declaring the hiring hall
contract unlawful because of failure to include the Mountain Pacific safeguards. The court rejected the Board's well-reasoned argument that its case-by-case method was no longer effective to
deal with the hiring hall problem because "the undeniably discriminatory result of the exclusive hiring hall flows as much from
119 N.L.R.B. at 896, 897 & 898.
It should be noted, however, that after the Mountain Pacific decision,
Congress added § 8(f) to the Taft-Hartley Act, 73 Stat. 545 (1959), 29
U.S.C.A. § 158(f) (Supp. 1960):
It shall not be an unfair labor practice . . . for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an
agreement . . . with a labor organization of which building and construction employees are members . . . because . . . (2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is
later ....

This is quite consistent with the Board's rule as may be inferred from
the statement that "nothing in such provision is intended to restrict the
applicability of the hiring hall provisions enunciated in the Mountain Pacific case . . . "' H.R. Rm,. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1959).
87. 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960).
88. E &B Brewing Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 354 (1958).
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the agreement itself as from the illegal operation of the halls of
some unions."" The court stated its disapproval of the per se
rule as follows:
As we understand the Board's position, it is that its experience proves
that its effort to pick off the sour fruit frequently, appearing on the
hiring hall tree has been ineffective and altogether frustrating, so
now it proposes to chop down the whole tree whenever it is not propped up by the Board's three "protective clauses." 90

Other language of the court indicates that it did not deny that
the Board may make rules through adjudication, but merely held
that it was improper to do so in this particular case:
There is no doubt that the Board has power, in appropriate cases, and
in furtherance of its delegated function of making the National Labor Relations Act work, to establish new rules. What may be called
new rules may stem from two sources or theories of power. One is
the broad grant of power in § 6 of the Act . . . Perhaps the Board
might have saved itself a lot of trouble by utilizing this method of
making a rule. . . . A second mode by which new rules sometimes
come into being is through the process of administrative adjudication.
Just as courts generally do not hesitate to announce new rules to govern novel or changed conditions, so administrative boards often lay
down new so-called 'interpretative' rules. . . . [W]hile we have no
occasion here to doubt that an administrative board, may, as the
-courts have always done, declare new rules through the process of
case to case adjudications, yet we think this Board has not properly
done so in this particular case. 9 '

The court's reasons for taking this position were that the Board
could not determine the legality of the hiring hall agreement where
that question had not been put in issue by the petition and that
the retroactive application of the Mountain Pacific rule in this
case would work hardship on the parties charged with violation.
The court recognized the fact that administrative law-making may
properly operate retroactively in the same manner as court lawmaking; nevertheless, it found that the application of the Board's
rule would work hardship on the employer and the union "altogether out of proportion to the public ends to be accomplished."92 One year after E. & B. Brewing Co., the United States
89. 276 F.2d at 597, quoting a statement made by the Board.
90. Ibid.
91. Id. at 598.
92. Id. at 600.
In NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 149 (9th Cir. 1952),
it was said that the test of whether an administrative ruling may be given
retroactive effect is whether "the practical operation of the Board's change
of policy . . . [will] work hardship upon respondent altogether out of
proportion to the public ends to be accomplished."
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Supreme Court, in Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB."
held that since Congress has not outlawed the hiring hall as
such, it was not within the power of the Board to do so; the legis-

lative history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that unions may
operate hiring halls as long as they are not used to create a closed
shop. The Court firther explained its position as follows:
It may be that the very existence of the hiring hall encourages
union membership. We may assume that it does. The very existence of
the union has the same influence .... But .. .the only encouragement or discouragement of union membership banned by the Act is
that which is "accomplished by discrimination." . . . [The Board's]
power, so far as here relevant, is restricted to the elimination of discrimination. Since the agreement contains such a prohibition, the
Board is confined to determining whether discrimination has in fact
been practiced.94
The dissent by Mr. Justice' Clark recognized that the need for

the Board's rule arises from the inherently coercive nature of the
hiring hall system:
Of the gravity of such a situation [referring to testimony of the
complainant that he always knew he had to be a member of the
union in order to have a job] the Board is the best arbiter and best
equipped to find a solution. . . .I need only assume that, by
thousands of common workers like Slater, (the complainant) the contract and its conditioning of casual employment upon union referral
will work a misunderstanding as to the significance of union affiliation unless the employer's abdication of his role be made less than
total and some note of the true function of the hiring hall be posted
where all may see and read. 95
The hiring hal is probably the closest institution to the closed
shop remaining on the industrial scene today. The Board's rule,
formulated as a result of its vast experience in labor relations and
requiring merely that the coercive and discriminatory elements of

the hiring hall be offset, seems to be a reasonable means of effectuating the anti-discrimination policies enunciated in the Labor
Act. The Supreme Court's denial of the Board's power to formulate a decisional rule requiring safeguards against discrimination in

hiring of employees appears to be no less than a judicial denial of
the Board's informed exercise of administrative power.
93. Local 357, Int'f Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961),
reversing Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 646
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
94. 365 U.S. at 675-76.
95. Id. at 691-92.
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MINORITY PICKETING FOR RECOGNITION

Another area of concerted activity-picketing for recognition"0
-has resulted in Board action and judicial consideration which
merits discussion. It demonstrates the formulation of a decisional
rule which met with disapproval in the courts as beyond the
Board's statutory powers, but which Congress found sufficiently
reasonable to form the basis for an amendment of the Act.
Section 8(b) (1) (A) provides that it shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.97 Section 8(b) (1) (A) was first interpreted by the Board
in Matter of National Maritime Union of America"s where the
Board held that the union had violated section 8(b) (2) by calling a strike during contract negotiations for the unlawful purpose
of obtaining a provision maintaining a discriminatorily operated
hiring hall. 9 Despite this finding, the Board was unable to conclude that the picketing, peaceful in nature, constituted activity to
"restrain" or "coerce" within the meaning of section 8 (b)( 1 ) (A).
The Board reasoned further that a broad application of section
8(b)(1)(A) to peaceful picketing would render section 8(b)
(4) (C) superfluous. That section makes it an unfair labor practice
for a union to "force or require" an employer to recognize it when
another union has been certified by the Board.' 0
In Curtis Bros.' the Board, overruling its prior decisions,
stated the broad rule that any picketing for recognition by a minority union was a violation of section 8(b) (1) (A). In so doing,
the Board distinguished between organizational and recognitional
picketing; it found the former to be permitted by the Act and the
latter to be conduct which would unlawfully "restrain and coerce"
the employees in the exercise of section 7 rights.'
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Board's decision in Curtis Bros.' The Court held that peaceful
96. Such picketing is conducted by a union with the object of forcing
the employer to recognize and contract with the picketing local although
it is not the chosen representative of his employees. The Board has distinguished this from organizational picketing which has as its purpose, according to the Board, to merely organize the employees with a view to demanding recognition in the future should majority support be acquired. See
Drivers Local 639 (Curtis Bros.), 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957) discussed infra.
97. See note 56 supra.
98. 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948).
99. See discussion of hiring halls in text accompanying notes 71-95
supra.

100.
101.
102.
103.

61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (1958).
Drivers Local 639 (Curtis Bros.), 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).
See note 56 supra.
NLRB v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
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picketing to compel the employer to recognize a minority union
as the representative of his employees is not conduct to "restrain
and coerce" the employees in the exercise of section 7 rights and
therefore does not constitute a violation of section 8(b)(1)(A).
The Court maintained that section 8(b) (1) (A) must be interpreted so as to safeguard the right to strike and that the Board's
broad holding would "impede" this right."'
While Curtis was pending in the Supreme Court, Congress passed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act which
added section 8(b) (7) to the Labor Act. This provision made
it an unfair labor practice for a union which is not currently certified to picket or threaten to picket when an object of such picketing is to gain recognition or to promote organization of the employees under any of the following circumstances: 1) the employer has lawfully recognized another union; 2) a valid representation election has been held within the preceding twelve months;
3) the picketing has been conducted without the filing of a petition for a representation election.
It is likely that the Supreme Court would have upheld the
Board's decision in Curtis had it issued its order on the basis of
section 8(b) (7). However, the Court rejected the Board's claim
that it could proceed against peaceful recognitional picketing directly under 8(b) (1) (A) without regard to the new section or its
limitations. The Court stressed the argument that the power of the
Board is limited to the scope of the congressional mandate, saying "Congress has been rather specific when it has come to outlaw particular economic weapons on the part of unions."'1° The
Court felt that the broad standard of section 8(b) (1 ) (A) did not
vest in the Board the power to "sit in judgment upon, and to condemn, a minority union's resort to a specific economic weapon,
here peaceful picketing.107
The Curtis case illustrates how the courts frequently restrict the
Board to the confines of the statute. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had pointed out that the Taft-Hartley Act was intended to balance the powers of labor and management in the
furtherance of their respective interests; it implied that Congress
had left a wide margin for interpretation and had set the broad
standards of which section 8(b) (1) (A) is an example."' 8 The
104. Id. at 282.

105. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, § 704(e), 73 Stat.

544 (1959), amending the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1958).
106. 362 U.S. at 282-83, quoting from NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960).

107. 362 U.S. at 282.

108. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93,

99-100 (1958).
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Court in Curtis warned against "finding in the nonspecific, indeed
vague, words 'restrain or coerce' that Congress intended the broad
sweep for which the Board contends."' 9 Rather, section 8(b)
(1) (A) grants power to the Board to proceed against only those
union tactics which involve violence, intimidation, and reprisal or
threats thereof. That the Court would have approved the Board
decision in Curtis had it been based on section 8(b) (7) is indicated by its citation with approval of NLRB v. Local 182, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters."' In that case the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recognized that section 8 (b) ( 1) (A) did not proscribe peaceful picketing for recognition, but that reliance on the
new section would produce such a result provided the activity fell
within the purview of section 8 (b) (7). It was there held that Congress, by the new section, had set the standard which alone would
be a guide for future decision.
This analysis further exemplifies the difference between the judicial and the administrative approaches to a single problem. The
courts, in their concern about arbitrary administrative action, strive
to prevent the Board from exercising powers not specifically
granted it by statute. The Board, guided by its careful evaluation
of the practical problems of labor-management relations, tends to
read between-the lines of the statute, as demonstrated by its Curtis
decision. The Board reasoned that the employees "cannot escape
a share of the damage caused to the business" '' of the employer
as a result of the picketing. The Board said that it could find "nothing in the statutory language of section 8(b) (1) (A) which limits
the intendment of the words 'restrain or coerce' to direct application of pressure."'1 2 The enactment of section 8(b) (7)3 dem-

onstrates congressional concern about the serious problems which
the Board, in Curtis Bros., found in minority union picketing for
recognition-but as to which the Supreme Court held the Board
to be unauthorized to construct a remedial rule under section 8
(b) (1) (A).
109. 362 U.S. at 290.
110. 272 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1959).
111. Drivers Local 639 (Curtis Bros.), 119 N.L.R.B. 232, 236 (1957).
112. Ibid.
113. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, § 704(e), 73
Stat. 544 (1959), amending the Labor Management Relations Act, 61
Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1958).
For treatments of § 8(b)(7) and the Landrum-Griffin amendments in
general, see Cox, The Landrum-Gri//in Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257 (1959); Comment, The LandrumGriffin Amendments: Recognition and Organizational Picketing, 45 CORNELL

L.Q. 769 (1960). The Curtis case has been discussed in: Isaacson.

"OrganizationalPicketing: What is the Laiv?-Ought the Law to be Changed?", 8 BUFFALO L.REv. 345, 360 (1959), and Comment, "Minority Picketing and Allied Activities Under the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act," 20 LA. L. REV. 400 (1960).
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E. THE FASHIONING

OF REMEDIES

Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act grants the
Board power to redress unfair labor practices by an order requiring the person committing such practice to cease and desist and
"to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies
of this Act . . ." .
The Board's broad discretion to fashion
remedies is limited, however, by the judicially imposed requirement that the remedy be "appropriate"'1 5 and "adapted to the
situation which calls for redress." 11 6
In F. W. Woolworth Company,1 7 the Board established an
explicit rule for the computation of back pay in cases involving a
discriminatory discharge. It unequivocally stated a policy for future application: "we shall order, in the case before us and in future cases, that the loss of pay be computed on the basis of each
separate calendar quarter or portion thereof during the period
from the Respondent's discriminatory action to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement.""" The language used by the Board
would not seem to permit an interpretation that would limit its
rule to the facts of the particular case before it. The desirability of
setting a standard for the computation of back pay for the present
and "future cases" was well supported by the Board. It maintained that in all unfair labor practice cases its aim was to restore the
employee to the situation which would have obtained in absence
of the illegal discrimination, and that the rule formulated was essential to accomplish this end.
For many years prior to this decision, the Board had followed
the practice established in Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,""
of calculating back pay on the basis of the entire period between discharge and offer of reinstatement. The change to the
Woolworth formula emerged from the accumulation of administrative experience which revealed that the old rule did not effectuate the policies of the Act; because employers were allowed
to deduct from back pay the amounts earned in temporary employment subsequent to discharge, they were induced to delay reinstatement where the employee had obtained a better paying
temporary job. It is interesting to note that neither the courts nor
Congress were able to recognize the deficiencies of the pre-Wooliworth rule. It required the understanding of the expert to with114. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935),

61- Stat. .147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
115. NLRB v. Linkbelt Co., 311 U.S. 584,

600 (1941).

as anlendcd,

116. NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318 (1940).
117. 90"N.L.R.B. 289 (1950).
118. Id. at 292-93. (Emphasis added.)
119. 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935).
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draw its own rule in favor of a more desirable one. Indeed, it
was the congressional approval of the pre-Woolworth formula
which raised the question whether the Board could change its
policy despite such approval. In Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami,
Inc.,"' the Board ordered reinstatement of discriminatorily discharged employees with back pay computed on the basis of the
Woolworth rule. The Supreme Court upheld the Board's order"'
saying that congressional re-enactment of section 10(c) while the
Board continued to adhere to its Pennsylvania Greyhound formula prevented neither the formulation of the Woolworth rule
nor its application to this and other like cases. In deference to the
Board's expertise, the Court stated:
[I]n devising a remedy the Board is not confined to the record of a
particular proceeding. "Cumulative experience" begets understanding

and insight by which judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permore than anything else the administrative
mits, differentiates perhaps
22
from the judicial process.'

The Court went on to say that depriving the Board of the power
to make changes based on experience would have required a
positive congressional enactment.
It has been suggested that "the reasons for withholding substitution of judicial judgment on choice of remedies may be stronger
than on many issues of statutory interpretation and the idea of
commitment of problems of remedies to administrative discretion
may therefore have validity in many cases.' 23 A refusal by the
courts to substitute judgment may be explained simply by reference to the involved nature of the remedies devised in the Pennsylvania Greyhound and Woolworth decisions. However, it may
well be questioned whether the courts would, in fact, be less qualified than the Board to determine whether one form of back pay
award would more adequately compensate the employee than another. On the other hand, in many of those cases in which there
has been substitution of judicial judgment to defeat Board rulemaking, the courts might well have considered the fact that " 'cumulative experience' begets understanding and insight." '24
120. 92 N.L.R.B. 1622 (1951).
121. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
122. Id. at 349.
123. 4 DAVIS § 30.10, at 252.
124. See discussion of comparative qualifications of agencies
courts at p. 654 infra.

and
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F. GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act requires
an employer to bargain in good faith with the representatives of
his employees as to wages, hours and other conditions of employment."l "Good faith" being the only standard prescribed by
Congress to govern behavior in the negotiating process, "the nature and extent of the control depend on the standards of good
faith adopted by the Board and the courts."' 6 In its search for a
yardstick by which to determine the existence of bad faith, the
Board at first set no absolute standards, and in some respects continued to base findings of bad faith on an examination of all the
circumstances. The Board, however, was prompted to formulate
an absolute standard by the employers' frequent practice of refusing to grant wage increases on grounds of financial inability, while
at the same time refusing to furnish the union with substantiating
data relating to the financial condition of the business.
The Board had originally held that refusal to furnish information as to financial condition was merely some evidence of bad
faith bargaining and that the employer's whole conduct must be
examined-that no single factor was conclusive evidence of bad
faith." Subsequently, in Whitin Mach. Works, ' the Board
held that an employer who bases his bargaining position on financial inability is required as a matter of law to furnish data relating to the wages of particular employees as an incident to bargaining and that failure to do so is a per se violation of the duty to
bargain in good faith. The Board said that "it is sufficient that the
information sought by the Union is related to the issues involved
in collective bargaining, and that no specific need as to a particular issue must be shown."'2 9
125. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958) reads: "It shall

be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, ... " Subsection (d)
defines collective bargaining:
. . . to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual ob-

ligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder . ..,
but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ....
61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958).
126. Delony, Good Faith in Collective Bargaining, 12 U. FLA. L. REv.
378, 396 (1959).
127. Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950).
128. 108 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1954), enforced, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
129. 108 N.L.R.B. at 1539.
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Truitt Mfg. Co."' raised the problem of whether the standard
adopted in Whitin should be applied not only to requests for information dealing with wage rates of particular employees but also
to proof of financial inability to pay by requiring the employer to
open his books for examination. In Truitt, the employer claimed
financial inability to give a wage increase and, on demand by the
union, refused to reveal data connected with the operations of the
business. The company was, however, willing to produce information as to comparative wage rates and competitive bidding. The
Board found a violation of section 8(a) (5) stating:
[1It is settled law, that when an employer seeks to justify the refusal
of a wage increase upon an economic basis . . . good-faith bar-

gaining under the Act requires that upon request the employer31attcmpt to substantiate its economic position by reasonable proof.'
The Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision on the facts but
indicated that refusal to furnish the data requested could not be a
per se violation of the Act. 1 2 This caveat was actually dictum
for the Court did not contend that the Board had gone beyond the
facts of the case to establish a rule of per se illegality. However,
the dissent was of the opinion that there had been a finding of violation as a matter of law, and took issue with what it termed the
Board's "ultra-vires law-making." The dissent 3 ' objected to
the Board's flat statement that "it is well settled law" that good
faith bargaining would require the employer to submit to the
union's demand. It distinguished the finding of an 8(a) (5) violation in the Board's Jacobs Mfg. Co."' decision on the ground
that in Jacobs the holding was based only on the facts in that
case. The dissent said that this was "a very far cry indeed from a
ruling of law that failure to open a company's books establishes
lack of good faith."' 36 Although the Board in Truitt indicated
that its decision was based solely on the particular facts of that
case, the contention of the dissent has some merit. One noted authority has pointed out the validity of the dissent's position, saying
130. 110 N.L.R.B. 856 (1954), enforcement denied, 224 F.2d 869 (4th
Cir. 1955), enforced, 351 U.S. 149 (1956).

131. 110 N.L.R.B. at 856.
132. The Court said: "Each case must turn upon its particular facts. The

inquiry must always be whether or not under the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met."
351 U.S. at 153-54.
133. Id. at 157.
134. The Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1951), enforced, 196
F.2d 680 (2d Cii. 1952).
135. 351 U.S. at 156.
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that with the35 Board's ruling in Truitt the "good faith" test became

insufficient.

The agency's attention is really focused on the particular items of
conduct which are alleged to fall short of accepted bargaining prac-

tices. The shortcomings are per se violations. The NLRB has undertaken to regulate the manner in which collective bargaining is conducted regardless of the actor's state of mind. 37
It seems clear that the Board in Truitt applied a per se doctrine
and that by claiming that it did not, the Court "evaded every issue."'1 38 In a later case, 3 9 the Board applied the Truitt ruling to
"particular facts" identical to those in Truitt. Then, in a subsequent decision, it further clarified its position by saying that the
broad duty to furnish financial information established in Truitt
would only apply when such information is specifically shown to
be relevant to an issue under negotiation."' This is clear indication of the Board's recognition that its per se doctrine could not
be applied arbitrarily and without qualification.
III. STARE DECISIS-THE SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION
OF DECISIONALRULES
The inclination of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies to follow
precedent is particularly relevant to any discussion of Board lawmaking through adjudication. Although statements have been
made to the effect that administrative agencies are not bound by
the principle of stare decisis to the same extent as the courts,"4 '
an examination of actual practice, especially in the National Labor
Relations Board, has revealed a strong tendency to follow prior
holdings and such holdings themselves have been phrased so as
to command future application.' 42 The need to maintain con136. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 1401

(1958).
137. Id.
at 1430.

138. Id.at 1432.
139. B. L. Montague Co.,.116 N.L.R.B. 554 (1956).
140. Pine Indus. Relations Comm., Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957).
The Board here said that in so holding it was following the Supreme
Court's opinion in NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
141. In American Glue Co. v. Boston & M.R.R., 191 I.C.C. 37, 39
(1932), the Interstate Commerce Commission stated its position as follows:
We are not bound by any rule of stare decisis. .

.

. But when, upon

a given state of facts, we reach a conclusion regarding certain rates
we will adhere to that conclusion in subsequent proceedings regarding
the same or similar rates unless new facts are brought to our attention,

conditions are shown to have undergone a material change, or we proceeded on a misconception or misapprehension.
Also see Pittman, The Doctrine of Precedents and Public Service Commissions, 11 Mo. L. REv.31, 41 (1946).
142. In its 1941 study the Attorney General's Committee on Administra-
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sistency in administrative decisions by adhering to precedent,'114
however, may frequently be outweighed by the need for flexibility.
Rules to the effect that specific conduct is unlawful per se are frequently applied to succeeding fact situations without consideration
of peculiar factors that should make the rule inapplicable; and
such a practice may result in serious administrative arbitrariness.
Changing economic conditions or new experience with changed
factual circumstances may necessitate shifts in Board policy. It
has been suggested thatA foundation of the existence of administrative agencies is flexibility through discretion. Sometimes the very justification for creation of
an administrative body is that it may exercise discretion in handling
individual problems which are difficult to fit within inflexible boundaries laid down by precedents. Any attempt to impose rules of rigid
adherence to the144notion of stare decisis would strike at the basis of
agency existence.

Thus it would seem that the establishment of a rule which would
inform employers and unions of the Board's position would be desirable, provided the Board may reverse its precedents to meet
changing conditions. Indeed the Board's actual practice indicates
its agreement with the latter proposition. It has followed prior decisions14 until such time as experience demonstrated that arbitrary application of the established rule would produce an undetive Procedure found it to be "a striking fact that in almost every instance
the agencies' officers who were interviewed expressed the belief that they
accorded to the precedents of their respective agencies as much weight as
is thought to be given by the highest court of a state to its own prior dccisions." U.S.

ATT'Y GEN. COMM. AD. PROC., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 466 (1941).
For an example of Board language commanding future application of
an established rule, see discussion of F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
289 (1950), in text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.
143. The failure to formulate rules may be more arbitrary than their
application where the recurrence of similar fact situations demands consistency in administrative decisions. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit stated, in NLRB v. Mall Tool Co., 119 F.2d 700, 702 (7th Cir.
1941), that "consistency in administrative rulings is essential, for to adopt
different standards for similar situations is to act arbitrarily." The problem
was well stated by one authority who said thatindividual orders may be particularly susceptible to attack, either because they come without previous warning, or because they are inconsistent with other orders in comparable situations. General regulations
on the other hand may be vulnerable to the charge that they are too
rigid and do not allow enough play for significant individual differences.
IN GOV'T AGENCIES,

Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3
L. REV. 470, 490 (1950).
144. Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative Decisions, 59W. VA. L. REV. 111, 131 (1957).
145. See Note, Stare Decisis in N.L.R.H. and S.E.C., 16 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REV. 618 (1939).
VAND.
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sirable or unfair result. At that time it has overthrown precedentin several instances a per se rule--to meet the special facts of the
case before it. 4 '
Strong considerations weigh against a rigid adherence to precedent; but difficult problems also arise in connection with deviations from stare decisis. Where a case is used as a vehicle for a
change of prior Board policy, the result is a retroactive application
of the new rule to the parties involved in the case in which the rule
is formulated; and retroactive rule-making may work serious hardship on parties who have relied upon former rulings. Thus, while
flexibility in administrative decisions is often essential, there may
be unconscious violations which would be avoided if the parties involved were apprised of the policy of the Board in advance. Mr.
Justice Clark has stated that "too often basic continuing problems
are not decided but are left to ad hoc adjudication. This gives industry no guide-lines and results in confusion. Certainly this must
be corrected by agency action."'"" It is inevitable, however, that
in setting down certain guide-lines by which industry may govern
its conduct of labor relations, the Board also creates the circumstances in which the retroactive application of a modified rule may
work hardship on those who have attempted to comply.
An example of the conflicting effects of the establishment of a
rule is found in the Board's development of its jurisdictional
standards. Even if Board policies as to certain practices are known,
there may be a variance between state and Board approaches to
the same problem. Consequently it should be known in which instances the Board will take jurisdiction."' s
The Board originally determined on a case-by-case basis whether or not it would take jurisdiction. In 1950, however, recognizing
the necessity for clarification of its policy, the Board established
specific jurisdictional standards by adjudication, 4 9 basing its
146. E.g., Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954), discussed

in text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.

147. Address by Tom C. Clark on "Administrative Justice, 1960" to the

annual meeting of the administrative law section of the American Bar

Association, as reported in Harris, Activities of the Section, 46 A.B.A.J.
1127 (1960).

148. One writer has suggested that "to the extent that the agency knows
the policy it desires to follow, to that same extent it should inform those
coming within its regulation of that policy." Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad
Hoc Approach-Which Should it Be?, 22 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 658

(1957).
149. See, e.g., Central Kentucky Broadcasting Co., Inc., 93 N.L.R.B.
1298 (1951); Tampa Times Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 224 (1951); Seven-Up Bottling Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1622 (1951); Cherokee County Rural Elec. Coop.
Ass'n, 92 N.L.R.B. 1181 (1951); Amalgamated Bank of New York, 92
N.L.R.B. 545 (1950); Press, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 1360 (1950); WBSR,
Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 630 (1950); Rutledge Paper Prod., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B.

625 (1950).
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change from the case-by-case method on the fact that "experience
warrants the establishment . . . of certain standards which will
better clarify and define where the difficult jurisdictional line can
best be drawn."' 0 Subsequently the problem of retroactivity
arose in Guy F. Atkinson Co. where the Board, after consistent
refusal to assert jurisdiction in the construction industry, had issued an order for reinstatement of an employee who had been discharged for failure to pay dues to the union with which the employer had a closed shop agreement. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the order of the Board because of the
"inequity of such an impact of retroactive policy making upon a
respondent innocent of any conscious violation of the act."'' In
1954 the Board established a further set of standards by means of
a series of press releases. 2 The latter method of announcing its
policy represents an attempt by the Board to avoid the retroactive
law-making through adjudication which invoked the court's disapproval in Atkinson.
While the courts have properly been concerned with retroactive
rule-making, there is also a considerable body of case law indicating that retroactive law-making through adjudication by an administrative agency is no less desirable than the same practice in
the courts.' 53 In fact, it cannot be denied that most judicial decisions which create law apply that law retroactiyely. Indeed, the
effectiveness of both the judicial and the administrative process is
best promoted by continuous re-evaluation of precedents resulting
in the creation of new law. Arbitrariness may result as well from
an excess of adherence to precedent as from unwarranted and
sharp deviations from prior policy. Thus in the formulation of a
rule by an administrative agency, as well as in judicial review of
the decision in which the rule is established, due regard must be
given to these countervailing considerations.
The announcement by the Board of its policy through the establishment of a per se standard, which more clearly defines illegal conduct than a rule which is subject to variant defenses, is
helpful from the standpoint of making administrative policy
known, and is conducive to a reduction of litigation."' However,
150. Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 636 (1950).
151. N.L.R.B. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 149 (9th Cir.
1952), denying enforcement to Guy F. Atkinson Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 143
(1950).
152. See Revision of NLRB JurisdictionalStandards, 34 L.R.R.M. 75
(1954).

153. See 2 DAVIS § 17.07, at 530-32, citing Optical Workers' Union v.
NLRB, 227 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956);
NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1954); NLRB
v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951).

154. With reference to Board rule-making, the following statement was
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where the facts of a particular case do not fit within the scope of
the prescribed standard, it is incumbent upon the Board to rule
either that the standard does not apply or to use the case as a vehicle for changing the standard."' 5 In those instances where the
Board fails to recognize the inapplicability of a standard to a particular fact situation, an aggrieved party still has available to him a
remedy in the courts.

IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NLRB
LAW MAKING THROUGH ADJUDICATION
The proliferation of controversies growing out of the legislation
regulating labor-management relations emphasizes the fact that
the adjudicatory function of the National Labor Relations Board

is its most important one. Furthermore, it cannot be disputed
that adjudication, whether judicial or administrative, inevitably results in the creation of law.15 6
In the development of the common law, as well as in judicial
application of regulatory statutes, the courts have held certain pracmade by the American Bar Association Committee on Agency Rule-Making:
Although the NLRB performs adjudicatory functions, the mass of
cases of which it disposes, though issued in the form of an adjudication, generates pressure to codify its substantive rules if only to avoid
an increase in -its case load by stating the full implication of departures from former precedents, even though unnecessary to disposition
of the immediate case.
Recognizing that the Board-and the courts-have had to proceed
for a time on a case-by-case basis in formulating, for example, the jurisdictional boundaries of "commerce," the Board by inviting public
participation in formulating jurisdictional boundaries, by issuing press
releases with respect to its jurisdictional policies has in fact engaged
in rule-making. We believe this to be desirable but recommend that
there be full.compliance with the rule-making provisions of the APA.
Report of the Committee on Agency Rule-Making (Administrative Lait
Section, American Bar Association), 11 AD. L BULL. 280 (1959).
155. The problem of setting standards and subsequently adjusting them
to specific cases, has been well stated as follows:
One need . . . in policy development is for more definiteness in

standards which guide in the approval or disapproval of licenses, certificates, and other applications, and in the decision of other types of
cases affecting concretely the rights of particular parties . . . . There
is, of course, necessity for adjustment to special circumstances, but
this often can be done through refinement of policy for new categories of situations . . . . [P]redictability evaporates where standards
are multiple and are weighed anew without reference to guiding
priorities in application to each situation.
REDFORD, NATIONAL REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: NEED FOR A NEw LooK

(1959).
156. Professor Davis has said that "development of new law through
the process of adjudication . . . amounts to no more than an administrative imitation of what courts have done from time immemorial." 2
DAvIs § 17.08, at 536.
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tices to be so clearly against the letter and spirit of the law that
they have declared them unlawful per se with the result that,
upon the finding of a single fact or set of facts, no extenuating circumstances can be a sufficient defense.1" 7 Similar holdings can
and do result from administrative adjudication; and because per se
rules are, to some extent, arbitrarily determined for reasons of administrative convenience,S' there is a real danger that their inflexibility may result in the denial of constitutional or statutory
rights. On the other hand, to require the Board to adjudicate and
determine each case without reference to the law and policy which
it has evolved through experience would be to ask the impossible:
and it would stultify the entire administrative process. The ultimate question is, then, not whether the Board should make law
through adjudication, but rather, where the fulcrum should be placed in balancing the need for effective administrative law-making
power against the need to protect individuals in a free society from
the effects of arbitrary and inflexible rules applied in administrative adjudication. The need to provide a check on administrative
action would seem to increase as agency policies become rigid and
inflexible. Certainly the Board's enforcement of a rule declaring
a practice unlawful per se involves considerable danger if that
declaration means that the rule will be followed indiscriminately in
cases which are significantly different from the particular fact situation in which the rule originated. Consequently, any examination
of the scope of the Board's power of adjudicative law making
must be concerned with the effectiveness with which the courts
have operated as a check on the arbitrary exercise of administrative power. Judges who review agency determinations, though less
familiar with the technicalities of a specialized problem, are nevertheless generally better qualified to evaluate the demands of due
process. On the other hand, it should also be clear that if the courts
are too quick to substitute their judgment for that of the Board, the
157. E.g., in the area of antitrust law, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927).
158. Professor Louis B. Schwartz has pointed out opposing contentions
on the question of whether per se rules are desirable in the antitrust field:
Among the opposing contentions are these: Per se rules are absolute
and inflexible, leaving no possibility of adaptation to peculiar circum-

stances of a particular business or to special requirements of trade

... . Per se rules, especially if applied by administrative tribunals
like the Federal Trade Commission, preclude the exercise of the specialized, informed discretion which is supposed to guide such bodies.
On the other hand, per se rules are easier for businessmen to under-

stand, eliminating pro tanto the vagueness which is one of the princi-

pal complaints against the antitrust laws, and easier for the government to enforce.
SCHWARTZ,

FREE ENTERPRISE AND

1959). (Emphasis added.)

ECONOMIC OROANIZATION

20 (2d ed.
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effective use of administrative expertise may be seriously compromised. Therefore, one important question is-what is the effect
of judicial substitution of judgment? If judicial review is to operate
effectively as a check on administrative action, it becomes necessary to resolve the question whether the Board is actually bound to
follow the decisions of the courts approving or disapproving of
Board-formulated rules or policies, and, if so, to what degree. An
answer to this question was well stated by one author as follows:
[I]n not every instance in which the Board's policy is upheld by the
(Supreme) Court is the Board thereafter precluded by judicial approv-

al alone from altering its policy. Where, however, judicial approval
of Board policy is based upon the Court's appraisal of the terms of
the statute, where the Court holds, in effect that the Board's policy is

the only one consistent with the effectuation of the Act's objectives,
the Board is no longer free to adopt a contrary policy, just as it is

not free after the Supreme Court has held a particular Board policy
inconsistent with the language or purposes of the Act to continue to
apply that policy.'5 9

The Blue Flash case discussed previously6 ° is an example
of change in Board policy pursuant to court disapproval of its
prior position. On the other hand, the adoption of the Woolvorth
-formula for back pay' 6 ' illustrates a situation in which the Board
changed its position despite court and congressional approval of
the Pennsylvania Greyhound rule.112 Thus, while it is clear that
court opinion will prevail where the Board has transgressed the
limitations of the statute, the experience of the Board may result
in a deviation from judicial decisions where the Board is acting
within its granted authority.
Of primary importance, therefore, is the question of whether
judicial opinions reviewing both Board and other administrative
decisions afford any discernible guidelines which could be of assistance in determining the scope of the Board's power to make
rules or in determining the extent to which the judiciary will substitute its judgment for that of the Board.
The foregoing discussion of substantive problems of labor law"
has afforded some indication of court treatment of Board decisions. However, it has not been established whether the courts
have developed any standards to be applied in reviewing Board decisions which result in the formulation of rules; nor is it clear
whether the manner of review varies at all between adjudications
159. Ratner, Policy-Making by the New "Quasi-Judicial" NLRB, 23 U.

Cm. L. REv. 12, 14 (1956).

160. See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra.
161. See text accompanying notes 117-18 supra.

162. See note 119 supra.
163. See discussion at pp. 615-37 supra.
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which are limited to application of statutes to the facts of a particular case and adjudications which, in addition, enunciate principles of law.
It can be said that courts reviewing administrative decisions
generally apply the substantial evidence rule under which the
court determines some questions of law but "limits itself to the test
of reasonableness in reviewing findings of fact."' 4 Substantial
evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." ''
It means that if the evidence, as it appears from the record taken
as a whole, supports the findings of the agency, the reviewing
court cannot set aside the administrative decision even though the
court would have reached an opposite conclusion had it determined the matter initially.' Originally, the National Labor Relations Act omitted the word "substantial" in its provision relating
to judicial review of Board decisions. However, pursuant to judicial interpretations to the effect that Congress intended review
to be based on substantial evidence, that term was incorporated
into the Act by the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947."'
A study of judicial opinions reviewing Board decisions will reveal that the courts will enforce or deny enforcement to a Board
decision, whether or not predicated on a Board-established rule,
through application of the substantial evidence test. If the case
also involves the establishment of a rule, the judicial approach
may vary from ignoring the rule to disapproving it as arbitrary or beyond the discretion of the Board. An example of
the first approach is the judicial enforcement of the Board's order in Washington Coca Cola'68 on the basis of substantial evidence and without any reference to the rules which the Board's
164. 4 DAvis § 29.01, at 114.

165. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), citing
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).

166. See Comm. on Admin. Law of the Dallas Bar Ass'n, Review of

Decisions of Administrative Agencies by Courts, 22 TEXAS B.J. 517, 538

(1959),

citing Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412

(1951).

167. Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by

the Taft-Hartley Act provides that-"the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive." 49 Stat. 454 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958). (Emphasis added.) The original Wagner Act provided that "[T]he findings of the Board, as to the facts, if

supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." Judicial interpretation of the
Wagner Act took the position that "evidence" meant "substantial evidence." For a summary of the history leading up to the Taft-Hartley

amendment adding the word "substantial" to the statute, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-86 (1951).

168. Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc. 107 N.L.R.B. 299

(1953). See discussion at p. 617 supra.
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decision established to supplement the Moore Dry Dock rules.0 9
The Moore Dry Dock rules themselves were not only approved by
the courts, but several decisions of the Board were denied enforcement because of failure to apply them.""0 In one such case, the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved of the rules
as "a sound interpretation of the Act."'"

However, no mention

was made in these decisions of the basis upon which the court

rested its support of the Board's adjudicative law-making. Some

insight into the manner in which the courts apply the substantial
evidence rule as a limitation upon adjudicative rule-making can
,e gained from Otis Massey, discussed previously. 7 2 In that case,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that the Moore
Dry Dock rules had never been approved as rules of general application but were merely held applicable to the facts of particular
cases, the substantial evidence rule serving as the primary yard-

stick. The court concluded its opinion with the following remarks:
While the drawing of appropriate inferences as to the unlawfulness
of objective and motive in a labor dispute is primarily the province of

the Board, there still must be some substantial basis for inferring a

wrongful rather than a legitimate motive, which we think does not
exist here. 73

Thus, the primary concern of the courts in these cases seems to
have been whether the Board's opinion rested on factual findings
sufficient to support the particular disposition of the case" independently of the rule incidentally established. It is uncertain,
therefore, whether rules declaring specific conduct unlawful per se,
will withstand judicial scrutiny for evidentiary findings when the
Board attempts to apply those rules to unusual fact situations.
169. See discussion of the Moore Dry Dock rules at p. 617 supra.

170. E.g., Piezonki v. NLRB, 219 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1955).
171. NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs Local 145, 191 F.2d 65, 68
(2d Cir. 1951).
172. NLRB v. General Drivers, AFL, 225 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955), see p. 618 supra.
173. 225 F.2d at 211.
174. This approach is based on the cardinal principle of administrative
law that a reviewing court cannot substitute its own findings or reasons
where it disagrees with the administrative decision. Instead it must remand the case for further findings by the agency. This principle has been
expressed by the Supreme Court as follows:
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment
which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must
judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by
the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is
powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it
considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the domain which Congress has set aside exclusively
for the administrative agency.
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
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The Sales Drivers case 7 5 also lends support to the proposition that the courts are primarily concerned not with the effective
scope of Board rule-making, but with the question of whether the
findings are sufficient to support the Board's conclusion. Thus, in
its initial decision denying enforcement of the Board's determination that section 8(b)(4)(A) had been violated, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia explained that the previous
affirmance of the Washington Coca Cola rule "must be construed
only as agreement with the conclusion the Board there reached,
which rested in considerable part upon additional findings. '"T'
Perhaps the best description of judicial review of administrative
law-making through adjudication that can be deduced from cases
such as Sales Drivers is that approval of a Board decisional rule
always carries with it the qualification that under the evidence in a
particular case, application of the rule accords with the judicial
interpretation of the controlling statute. A dual purpose is actually
served by this type of review-the rule advises parties within the
Board's jurisdiction of administrative policy, but arbitrary application of the rule is prevented through judicial insistence on substantial evidence to support the Board's order."'
Distinctly analogous at this point are the well-known Chenery
decisions"7 8 which, although involving the Securities and Exchange Commission, resulted-as did Sales Drivers-in a remand
to the agency followed by court affirmance of a better supported
opinion reaching the same conclusion. The Chenery cases may
also be instructive as an illustration of the judicial approach to
administrative law-making and may suggest some theories which
explain that approach. The question raised by these cases concerned the propriety of an order of the Commission denying officers, directors and controlling stockholders of a holding company
equal participation with all other preferred stockholders in the
reorganization of the company. The Court held that in determining whether the proposed reorganization plan was "fair and equitable" within the meaning of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act, the Commission was neither bound by nor could it properly
base its decision upon judicial precedents which established equitable principles respecting a fiduciary's "duty of fair dealing." The
175. See discussion at p. 618 supra.
176. 229 F.2d at 517.
177. As pointed out in text accompanying notes 54-55 supra, the
Board's decision on remand in Sales Drivers Union (Campbell Coal Co.),
116 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1956), reaching the same conclusion based on findings
previously disregarded, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 512 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958 (1958).
178. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) and 332 U.S. 194
(1947).
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Court seemed to hold that in determining the extent to which directors or officers should be prohibited from buying or selling
stock of the corporation during reorganization, the Commission's
order must be based on a general rule promulgated in reliance
upon "its special administrative competence."' 7 9 The Court stated:
But before transactions otherwise legal can be outlawed or denied
their usual business consequences, they must fall under the ban of
some standards of conduct prescribed by an agency of government
authorized to prescribe such standards-either the courts or Congress

or an agency to which Congress has delegated its authority.1 s0

In its concluding remarks, the Court seemed, however, to retract somewhat from this requirement of a preliminary, agencyformulated rule, returning once more to the primary requirement
of an adequate foundation for the administrative decision:
mhe orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the

grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained. . . . We merely hold that an ad-

ministrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which
the agency acted in exercising
its powers were those upon which its
8
action can be sustained.' '
What the Court seems to have said is that the formulation of a
rule by the Commission (under the agency's substantive rule-making power) would serve as a guide to the court on review in determining whether the adjudicative order was founded in reason.

Thus, the Court did not necessarily take the position that rulemaking is the only proper approach.
On remand, the Commission explained its position on the basis
of its own interpretation of the statute and reached the same
conclusion. 1 2 This time the Supreme Court affirmed.m The
second Chenery decision is of great significance in any consideration of the scope of judicial review of administrative orders. The
Court expressly denied that it had meant in its first opinion to
make the promulgation of a general rule a condition precedent to
sustaining the Commission's order. It merely made the following
suggestion:
Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make
new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers,
it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new
standards of conduct . . . . The function of filling in the interstices
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

318 U.S. at 92.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 94-95.
Federal Water Service Corp., 18 S.E.C. 231 (1945).
332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this
quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.
But any rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise. . . . [A]n administrative agency must
be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. 184

It is clear that the Court recognized that rules of prospective application might properly be created by administrative adjudica-

tion as well as by the exercise of the rule-making power, for the
Court further stated:
There is thus a very definite place for the case-by-case evolution o
statutory standards. And the choice made between proceeding by
general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.1 85

Of greatest relevance to the present discussion is the statement
of the Court that the Commission could utilize "this particular
proceeding for announcing and applying a new standard of conduct."'" 6 Of course, such a proposition inevitably raises the problem of the retroactive application of a rule established in a case
of first impression. But the Court recognized that the solution of
any controversy not previously encountered, necessarily involves
187
retroactive law-making whether by an agency or a court.
The principles advanced in the Chenery cases can easily be applied to the Labor Board's law-making through adjudication."'
Recognizing the difficulty of limiting a rule announced in an adjudicative administrative order to prospective force and seeking to
avoid retroactive law-making as much as possible, it might be well
to advocate an extension of the Board's use of substantive rulemaking under the broad grant of power of section 6 of the National Labor Relations Act.'89 Indeed recent suggestions to that
184. Id. at 202.
185. Id. at 203. (Emphasis added.)
186. Ibid.
187. The Court said:
Every case of first impression has a retroactive effect, whether the
new principle is announced by a court or by an administrative agency.
Ibid.
188. It should be noted that the substantive rule-making powers of the
SEC have never been questioned, whereas the rule-making powers of
the NLRB have, in the past, been limited to procedural regulation, see
note 9 supra. This does not make the Chenery decisions inapplicable to the
NLRB, however, because the Court in the second Chenery case, while
recognizing the Commission's statutory power to make substantive regulations, independently established the propriety and ability of the SEC to
make law through adjudication. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
189. See note 8 supra.
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effect have been made.19 Furthermore, judicial opinions such as
those in Washington Coca Cola, Sales Drivers and Chenery would
seem to attach full validity to the creation of law through administrative adjudication as long as the individual order is based on
"substantial evidence." As the Court explicitly pointed out in the
second Chenery case:
The scope of our review of an administrative order wherein a new
principle is announced and applied is no different from that which pertains to ordinary administrative action .... Our duty is at an
end when it becomes evident that the Commission's action is based
upon substantial
91 evidence and is consistent with the authority granted
by Congress.
Thus, the primary concern is to determine the scope of the rulemaking power that remains in the Board after application of the
"substantial evidence" test to adjudicative rule-making. It can
readily be seen how the purpose of the judicial requirement of
adequate findings to support an administrative decision could be
thwarted through the establishment and application of a per se
rule. Let us assume that the Washington Coca Cola rule had been
affirmed, not only on the facts of that particular case, but also to
the extent of allowing the Board to find prohibited secondary activity as a matter of law whenever picketing was conducted on
neutral premises despite the existence of a primary situs in the
area. A case might then arise in which the union could prove that
the employees were unable to go to the primary situs during the
day for the purpose of picketing. The Board, relying on judicial
approval of the per se rule, could then issue a cease and desist
order; but such an order would be in disregard of proof which
should bear upon the desirable scope of the prohibition of secondary boycotts. Adherance to the requirement of substantial evi,dence of a statutory violation assures that the formulation of Board
policy will continually be based upon an understanding of new
problems as they develop.
A very recent Supreme Court decision192 demonstrates clear
judicial disapproval of application of previously declared per se
rules. In denying the power of the Board to declare a hiring hall
unlawful per se,'93 the Court stated that because there was "no
express ban of hiring halls in any provision of the Act, those who
190. See Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor RelationsBoard,70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961).
191. 332 U.S. at 207.
192. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961),
reversing Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 646

(D.C. Cir. 1960).

193. See discussion of hiring halls and particularly the Mountain Pacific

case at p. 624 supra.
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add one, whether the Board or the courts, engage in a legislative
act." 19 The Court further expressed its position as follows:
Perhaps the conditions [referring to those enunciated by the Board
in Mountain Pacific1 95] which the Board attaches to hiring-hall arrangements will in time appeal to the Congress. Yet where Congress has
adopted a selective system for dealing with evils, the Board is confined to that system. Where . .. Congress has aimed its sanctions
only at specific discriminatory practices, the Board cannot go farther
and establish a broader, more pervasive regulatory scheme ...
[The Board's] power, so far as here relevant, is restricted to the
elimination of discrimination. Since the present agreement contains
such a prohibition, the Board is confined to determining whether discrimination has in fact been practiced. If hiring halls are to be suband more pervasive, Congress
jected to regulation that is less selective
1
not the Board is the agency to do it. 96
Judicial disapproval of the use of the adjudicatory power to cstablish per se rules has also been apparent in cases in which the
courts, on review, have found substantial evidence to support the
Board's determination. Thus, in NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co.," ' the
United States Supreme Court approved findings which supported
the determination that there had been a failure to bargain in good
faith but disapproved the rule advanced by the Board. The Court
explained its position as follows:
T~e Board concluded that under the facts and circumstances of this
case the respondent was guilty of an unfair labor practice in failing
to bargain in good faith. We see no reason to disturb the findings of
the Board. We do not hold, however, that in every case in which
economic inability is raised as an argument against increased wages
it automatically follows that the employees are entitled to substantiating evidence. Each case must turn upon its particular facts. The inquiry must always be whether or not under the circumstances of the
particular case the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has
been met. Since we conclude that there is support in the record for
the conclusion of the Board here that respondent did not bargain in
good faith, it was error for the Court of Appeals to set aside the
Board's order and deny enforcement.' 98
From the foregoing analysis it can be seen that the courts in
reviewing the Board's decisions, are primarily interested in insuring that the evidentiary basis for an order is sufficient to bring the
particular facts of a case within the purview of the regulatory
statute and that the agency does not exceed the bounds of its delc194. 365 U.S. at 674.
195. See discussion at p. 624 supra.
196. 365 U.S. at 676-77.
197. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956): see discussion at
p. 636 supra.
198. 351 U.S. at 153-54. (Emphasis added.)

NOTES
gated authority. The substantial evidence rule, which leaves some
questions of law for the decision of the court,"' 9 could be a very
helpful guide for determining the scope of judicial review, if it
were clear what is meant by a question of law and which questions
of law may properly be left to the Board. In deciding whether
evidence found by the Board is sufficient to establish the commission of an unfair labor practice, the court engages in statutory
interpretation which is included in the general understanding of
the term "question of law." But is the interpretation of a regulatory statute properly placed within the sole province of the courts?
Are there not statutory provisions which could be better interpreted by the agency created for the administration of the statute
in the public interest? Is the function of applying the statute entirely one of "interpretation"-or is it also one of supplementing
the statute and building upon it a substructure of policy developed
from administrative experience? Is it not the realization by the
courts that an expert body is frequently better qualified to decide those questions which would typically be classified as "questions of law" that has led to great difficulty and confusion in determining when the court will substitute its judgment for that of
the agency?
Of course, most of the fears of arbitrary administrative action
could be dispelled by a rule which insures judicial check through
substitution of judgment on all questions of law. There is, however, widespread recognition of the fact that many issues are better left to agency discretion. The language of the Administrative
Procedure Act supports this proposition for the requirement that
"the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law" is
qualified by the words, "except so far as . . . agency action is
by law committed to agency discretion."2 ' The important question thus becomes-to what extent is the development of law
through adjudication "committed to agency discretion?" Professor
Davis has made the following observation:
[Slubstitution of judicial judgment on all questions that are literally
or analytically "law" is undesirable, for many questions of policy

which through adjudication or rule making become crystallized into

law are peculiarly within the agency's competence and not especially

within the competence of the reviewing court. This is probably the

main reason-although the motivations are complex-for the Supreme
Court's frequent rejection of the literal or analytical approach to
the law-fact distinction0

1

Because of the difficulty of placing questions of law and ques199. See discussion of the substantial evidence test at p. 644 supra.

200. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
201. 4 DAvis § 30.01, at 191-92.
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tions of fact into two separate and distinct categories, we find
few advocates of the proposition that the courts should attempt to
make such a clear cut distinction. Countless questions fall into
the large gray areas between law and fact which may be described
as "policy." In these areas, the courts are frequently quite willing
to recognize the Board's competence to make rules-even per se
rules-and may occasionally even require adherence to such
rules. °0 A good example of judicial acceptance of adjudicative
rule making by the Board, considered earlier in the discussion
of the fashioning of remedies, " 3 is the development by the Labor
Board of formulas for the computation of back pay ordered as the
result of discriminatory discharge. The Supreme Court, in Sevenup Bottling2 4 stated:
"[T]he relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence." That competence could not be exercised if in
fashioning remedies the administrative agency were restricted to considering only what was before it in a single proceeding.
This is not to say that the Board may apply a remedy it has worked
out on the basis of its experience, without regard to circumstances
which may make its application to a particular situation oppressive
and therefore not calculated to effectuate a policy of the Act.205
But is an interpretation of legislative intent, in providing for back
pay in section 10(c) of the Labor Act, the determination of a
question of fact, or of policy and law? It seems more likely that
the Court was really saying that it will call a question one of fact
where it is of the opinion that the informed discretion of the expert body would better carry out the congressional purpose than
the more removed, less technical evaluation that can be made by
the judiciary.
An alternative to the law-fact distinction used by the courts on
review is the rational basis test explained in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications,2 6 where the Court said that "the Board's determination that specified persons are 'employees' under this Act is to
be accepted if it has 'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis
in law."2 7 The Hearst case involved a question of construction
of a statutory term (whether newsboys are "employees" within the
National Labor Relations Act) 2 1; yet the Court refrained from
calling it a question of law and approved the establishment of an
interpretative precedent by the Board. On the other hand when the
202. See, e.g., note 170 supra.

203. See discussion at pp. 633-37 supra.

204. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
205. Id. at 349.
206. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
207. Id. at 131.
208. 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1958).
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clearly analogous question of whether foremen were to be considered "employees" arose in a subsequent case, the Court substituted
its judgment for that of the Board.0 9 More recently, the Supreme Court substituted judgment on the general question of
whether a labor organization can be considered an "employer"
as that term is used in the Act.21 0
Numerous other cases beyond the scope of this Note could serve
as authority for the proposition that the courts have never explicitly formulated the bases upon which they decide to substitute
their judgment for that of the Board or refrain from doing so
out of deference to administrative expertise.1-1 Although there is
some indication that substitution of judgment is more likely where
the agency uses an administrative adjudication for the enunciation
of a broad and inflexible principle of law or policy,2 12 no generalization can accurately be made to that effect. Thus, the establishment of a general rule relating to the period of time during
which an employer may not challenge a Board certification, was
held to be within the discretion of the Board "in carrying out congressional policy." 1 3 Indeed, one reason for a hands-off approach on the part of the courts is their expressed reluctance to
delve too far into the sphere of policy formulation.21 This may
be explained by the fact that policy is often better developed
through the constant and detailed study of an individual area in
which the administrative body is engaged.
Some other bases for substitution of judgment have been suggested. One is that there may be substitution when inconsistency
in administrative decisions indicates that an agency is uncertain
respecting the proper approach to a problem.215 Thus the Supreme Court upheld a reversal of the Board in PackardMotor Car
Co. v. NLRB, - 6 saying: "If we were obliged to depend upon administrative interpretation for light in finding the meaning of the
statute, the inconsistency of the Board's decisions would leave us
in the dark. 217
The theory has also been advanced that a court may substitute
209. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).

210. Office Employees v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957).
211. See discussion concerning lack of judicial consistency with respect
to substitution of judgment in 4 DAVIS § 30.07, at 229-33.

212. See, e.g., Office Employees v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957); FCC v.

RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
213. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954).
214. In one opinion the Supreme Court stated that in reviewing Board
decisions the courts "must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain
of policy." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
215. See 4 DAvis § 30.08, at 236.
216. 330 U.S. 485 (1947).

217. Id. at 492.
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judgment in order to give judicial approval to a rule to which the
agency may not adhere because of lack of confidence in its desirabilityY is Frequently the question of whether to substitute
judgment depends upon the agency involved or, more precisely,
upon the degree of discretion which is expressly placed in an agency by the statute from which its powers are derived. 19
Rather than providing an answer to the question of what criteria the courts employ in determining whether to substitute judgment on issues involving administrative law making through adjudication, the preceding analysis has demonstrated that the question cannot be answered definitively. Generally the question of
whether or to what extent courts should substitute their judgment
for that of an agency on questions of law or policy should be governed by a consideration of the comparative qualifications of
court and agency to determine particular types of issues.2 ' The
courts are probably best qualified to determine questions involving
the application of the common law or the interpretation of statutes
in accordance with congressional purpose. There are, however,
areas in which an expert body may have greater insight and understanding; these may be issues involving the interpretation of technical terms, or they may involve determinations of the effect that
certain practices will have, considered in the light of long and intensive study in the particular field and familiarity with similar
fact situations. One decision expressing the need for deference to
administrative expertise is NLRB v. Standard Oil Co."2' Although the position taken in this case may currently be discredited,
the language of the court is nevertheless significant:
[Tihe question of how deeply an employer's relations with his employees will overbear their will, and how long that influence will last,
is, or at least it may be thought to be, [one], to decide which a
board, or tribunal chosen from those who have had long acquaintance
with labor relations, may acquire a competence beyond that of any
court. That there can be issues of fact, which courts would be altogether incompetent to decide, is plain. If the question were, for example, as to the chemical reaction between a number of elements, it
would be idle to give power to a court to pass upon whether there was
218. See 4 DAvis § 30.08, at 235, citing SEC v. Central-Illinois Securities
Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949).
219. See 4 DAVIs § 30.08, at 237.
Statistics show how substitution of judgment varies among different administrative agencies. Between 1951 and 1956, the Labor Board decided
139 cases out of which 98 were affirmed and 46 reversed. Five of the 6
cases decided by the FCC were affirmed; all 5 cases decided by the FPC
were affirmed, as were 4 cases in the CAB and the 3 cases decided by the
ICC and SEC respectively. Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial
Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. 945, 948 (1958).
220. For a discussion of the concept of comparative qualifications see
4 DAvis § 30.09, at 240-46.
221. 138 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1943).
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"substantial"
evidence to support the decision of a board of .qualified
222
chemists.

From all the considerations discussed above that may be helpful
in clarifying the outlines of the scope of agency rule-making
power and the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions, no definite formula for the substitution of judicial judgment
can be derived. However, the unpredictability of the approach of
the courts is not authority for the proposition that there is no effective check on administrative action. The same reasons which exist for saying that undue inflexibility may result from the establishment of a Board rule declaring certain conduct a violation of the
Act as a matter of law, may militate against the creation by the
judiciary of fixed standards for the substitution of judgment. It is
quite apparent that the determination of whether a specific issue
is one to be decided by the courts or by the agency rests within
judicial discretion. This discretion should be applied on a case-bycase basis, for the narrow boundary lines that often exist between
law and fact and judicial versus administrative qualification to
judge, remain blurred simply because the extenuating factors appearing in individual cases cannot be predicted. One such factor
can make an otherwise valid administrative rule inapplicable to
a particular case; one statutory provision can turn interpretation
of legislative intent which is generally considered a question of
law, into a question-or a class of questions-that must be resolved by the application of administrative expertise. Thus it does
not seem that the establishment of a code to define the precise
scope of judicial review would be either feasible or desirable. The
judicial check seems to be present where it is essential.
CONCLUSION
Bureaucracy is a controversial word. It furrows the brow of the
political philosopher and lends flavor to the conversation of the
drawing room cynic. It has come to convey the stigma of officious
arbitrariness in a society dedicated to freedom from an excess of
governmental control.
222. Id. at 887.

Professor Davis has pointed out that while the last sentence of the language quoted may be excessive, the basic idea seems to be sound. He also
made the following observation:
Judges and administrators may be about equally competent in determining most issues arising under labor relations legislation, and yet
on this specific issue [whether an employer's influence was determinative in the formation of a new union] the scope of review may
properly be limited on account of the Board's special competence.

4 DAvis § 30.09, at 245.
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But the development and expansion of government services inevitably brings with it a need for decentralization and a distribution of functions between the individual units that comprise the
whole machine. An analogy may be found in the development of
an industry. Increased demand, the growth of the business, the
expansion into new lines of production all result in a division of
the labor force into various specialized groups. The industry becomes decentralized to the extent that a need for cohesion arises,
resulting in the formulation of company rules; but the rules are
general in nature and do not extend to the details of the work of
chemists, engineers and accountants. They develop their own rules
within the scope of their specialized fields. The management then
fears that the specialists will abuse their discretion and encroach
upon the functions of other branches of the industry. Thus the
supervisor is appointed to administer the general rules and check
abuses of power committed under the guise of expertise. The counterparts in the governmental structure can readily be discerned
in the Congress, the expert administrative agencies and the courts.
Despite the frequently-expressed desire for freedom from governmental restraints, we have been compelled to accept a considerable amount of regulation. To combat the abuses to which labor was subjected at the hands of management before the advent
of 1930 reforms, the National Labor Relations Board was selected as the arbiter of labor-management relations. But the Board
could not fulfill its function without the concomitant power to
formulate policy. We should not question whether the Board may
make law through adjudication, for to establish a tribunal and
subsequently wonder whether it may properly develop a body of
precedents and rules is to create a paradox. The real question is
one of degree-to what extent should the administrative law-making function pervade adjudication?
The pros and cons of Board-formulated rules of general applicability as an alternative to a pure case-by-case approach are fairly
clear, as the preceding discussion suggests. The pros undoubtedly
prevail. Those who fear bureaucratic arbitrariness because of the
unpredictability of Board decisions and constant shifts in policy,
cannot be heard to complain of the Board's attempt to cure this
defect through the establishment of criteria which will serve as
guidelines for the future decision of similar cases. In the crosssection of labor problems discussed above, there is strong indica,tion that rules of per se illegality are often warranted by the practices sought to be curtailed. Furthermore, the Board has shown
self-limitation in the application of the standards it has set. Board
shifts in policy despite judicial and legislative approval of its
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prior position, have generally been the result of expert understanding of technical problems.
One factor that may militate against decisional rules is their
retroactive application to parties who acted in reliance upon prior
policy. On the other hand, it must be realized that any adjudication which builds upon existing law, whether in the courts or in
administrative tribunals, operates retroactively. Alternatively, there
is a possibility of establishing a rule and giving it only prospective
force. Of course, one clear means of avoiding retroactivity is for
the Board to announce its policy independently of adjudication,
through the rule-making power. Presently, the extent of the
Board's power to make substantive regulations under the broad
grant of power of section 6 of the Labor Act remains vague.
Clarification of the rule-making power through judicial interpretation of section 6 would provide a sounder foundation than now
exists for assertions about the source from which Board rules and
policy should emerge.
Generally if a Board decisional rule is good, it should stand to
advise unions and management of what is lawful under the Act,
thus avoiding a mass of useless litigation. If the rule is arbitrary,
inflexible or impossible of application to all similar situations under the exigencies of changing conditions or peculiar fact situations, there is ever present the check of judicial review, which
brings to the administrative decision the perspective that the specialist may lack. Although there is considerable uncertainty about
the manner in which courts will deal with Board decisions and a
consequent need for some judicial declaration of specific bases
for substitution of judgment, a rigid formula for judicial review
would probably be undesirable. Indeed the unpredictability of judicial action in passing upon decisions of lower courts as well as
administrative decisions seems unavoidable in the maintenance of
a flexible system of review.

